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THE IMPACT OF CONSERVATION LAWS AND
DECISIONS UPON THE MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS
OF THE MINERAL LEASE
James A. George*
INTRODUCTION
The evolution of the so-called "implied covenants" in mineral
leases has been termed a "progression from cocksure ignorance
to thoughtful uncertainty" in an article appropriately entitled
"Implied Covenants- The New Look Under Conservation
Laws."' The "new look" alluded to in that title has been a result
of the many radical changes wrought by the transition from the
theory of production which was manifested in the formative
years of the mineral production industry to the antithetic philos-
ophy of conservation which now reflects the public interest in
the preservation of exhaustible mineral reserves. This some-
times painful evolution has carried in its wake much confusion
and doubt as to the role which the implied covenants are allowed
to play within the confines of the various regulatory schemes
presently in force throughout all the mineral-producing states.
Due to the birth of the implied covenant doctrine at a time when
there existed an almost complete ignorance of the very nature of
oil and gas deposits, and of the geological conditions affecting
them,2 growing technical knowledge has been accompanied by
increasing restriction on the operation of the covenants. Or, as
stated by one of the leading authorities in the law of implied
covenants, "we should expect a change in the factual basis upon
which a rule of law rests to bring about a correspondent change
in the rule. ' 3 Such "correspondent changes" have been extensive
in some segments of this body of law, and it will be the purpose
of this article to provide a general discussion of those changes
and the reasons for them, as well as the resultant effects on the
"traditional" lessor-lessee relationship. The emphasis will be on
the Louisiana cases and rules.4
*Member, New Orleans Bar; formerly law clerk to Judge John T. Hood,
Jr., Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit.
1. Cline, Implied Covenants -The New Look Under Conservation Laws, 6
ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INST. 471 (1961).
2. Merrill, Implied Covenants, Conservation and Unitization, 2 OKLA. L. REV.
469, 470 (1949).
3. Id. at 469.
4. This paper will attempt to center attention on the covenants which have
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HISTORICAL SURVEY; ORIGIN OF COVENANTS
In an early Pennsylvania decision5 involving a suit for can-
cellation of a quarry lease, it was said to be clear that the "par-
ties contemplated that the quarry should be worked by the de-
fendants to some extent, and not lie idle and unproductive to the
landlord." 6 In so holding, the court was recognizing a basic prin-
ciple of law that whenever a relationship exists in which com-
pensation to one party depends wholly upon the diligent conduct
of the other, the law will imply a duty upon the other to be dili-
gent, even in the absence of express contractual provisions. Sev-
eral other Pennsylvania decisions gave similar treatment to ex-
press provisions in leases, but it was not until 1889 that the Su-
preme Court of that state had occasion to express itself specific-
ally on the possibility that there could be implied from a mining
or mineral lease (or, inferred from the lessor-lessee relation-
ship) covenants to develop. In that year, the case of Stoddard
v. Emery7 was decided, in which case the following dictum ap-
peared:
"Had there been nothing said in the contract on the subject,
there would of course have arisen an implication that the
property should be developed reasonably, and evidence of a
custom of reasonable development by boring a given number
of wells in a certain space of time, would have been compe-
tent and perhaps controlling."
Only a year later, in 1890, this dictum was translated into a rule
of law, in a holding that certain obligations would be deemed to
be implied from the lease provisions in proper cases.9 Shortly
thereafter, the doctrine spread to Ohio and West Virginia, and
by 1902 had also been fully recognized in California, Indiana,
and Texas. By this time it may be said to have become a gen-
erally recognized rule of law, utilized to promote the immediate
development of leased premises. 10
been "inferred" from the lessor-lessee relationship, commonly referred to as the
"implied" covenants of the mineral lease. For a complete discussion of recent
developments in the field of express covenants, see Comment, The Effect of
Unitization on the Duration and Extent of Mineral Interests in Louisiana, 37
TUL. L. REv. 769, 784-98 (1962).
5. Watson v. O'Hern, 6 Watts 362 (Pa. 1837).
6. Id. at 368 (dictum).
7. 128 Pa. 436, 18 Atl. 339 (1889).
8. Ibid.
9. Ray v. Western Pa. Nat. Gas Co., 138 Pa. 376, 20 Atl. 1065 (1890).
10. MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES 42-47 (2d ed.
1940) [hereinafter cited as MERRILL].
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It has been said that "the original structure of oil and gas
jural law was founded on a factual void."1 This statement, of
course, referred to the fact that the law of implied covenants
stemmed basically from the mistaken assumption that the min-
erals were inexhaustible and migrant. Proceeding from this as-
sumption, the courts worked their way to the conclusion that
the law governing the production of minerals from the land
should be the same as that which governed the capture of ani-
mals ferae naturae and subterranean waters, i.e., he who cap-
tures them first is their owner. From this analogy was born the
"Law of Capture," from which in turn sprang the rule requir-
ing "offset drilling.' 2 Under these theories, the landowner was
said to have the right to drill for and "capture" all the oil and
gas he could before the minerals escaped and migrated from his
land. No one suspected at that time that these were erroneous
assumptions of fact, and the courts' advice to one who com-
plained that a competing neighbor was reducing "his" minerals
to possession was "Go, thou, and do likewise. '13 As a result of
these beliefs, the fountainhead of the doctrine of implied cove-
nants was developed - the elemental public policy of develop-
ment. In this context, the reasons for the doctrine were said to
be the following, inter alia: (1) the primary object and consid-
eration of an oil and gas lease is the payment of royalties; (2)
since minerals are inexhaustible, they are of no value until they
are captured and marketed, and it is to the best interests of the
lessor and the general public that they be captured as quickly
as possible; (3) since the lessor has invested the lessee with the
exclusive right to drill on the land and is powerless to exercise
that right himself, the lessor's reasonable expectation of devel-
opment should be afforded protection by the law.' 4 The shift in
emphasis from the interests of the private owner of the land
underlain by the minerals, exemplified in the development phi-
losophy, to those of the public, or the conservation attitude, has
11. Cline, Implied Covenants, The New Look Under the Conservation Laws,
6 ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INST. 471, 472 (1961).
12. Eberhardt, Effect of Conservation Laws, Rules and Regulations on Rights
of Lessors, Lessees and Owners of Unleased Mineral Interests, 5 INSTITUTE ON
OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 125, 127 (1954).
13. Barnard v. Monogahila Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 365, 65 Atl. 801, 802
(1907).
14. See Eberhardt, Effects of Conservation Laws, Rules and Regulations on
Rights of Lessors, Lessees and Owners of Unleased Mineral Interests, 5 INSTI-
TUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 125, 128 (1954) ; Cline, Implied
Covenants, The New Look Under the Conservation Laws, 6 RocKY MT. MINERAL
L. INST. 471, 474 (1961).
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caused the courts to stress the interests of both the lessor and
the lessee more often than the special interest of the lessor only.15
AN OUTLINE OF THE IMPLIED COVENANTS
Although the lessor's transfer to his lessee of the exclusive
right to operate on the land contemplates some duty of the lessee
with respect to conduct of operations, most leases do not attempt
to set out in great detail the precise manner in which these op-
erating rights are to be exercised because of the impossibility of
foreseeing the many ways in which this might be effected.' 6
Therefore, the courts have evolved broad implied obligations of a
lease, the standard classification of which is the following :i7
(1) The implied covenant to drill an exploratory well.
(2) The implied covenant to drill additional wells - the dili-
gent development obligation.
(3) The implied obligation to market the product if discov-
ered in paying quantities.
(4) The implied covenant to protect the leased land against
drainage by wells on adjoining land.
The standard of performance underpinning all of the implied
covenants is that the lessee shall perform to the extent expected
of "operators of ordinary prudence, having regard to the inter-
ests of both lessor and lessee" 18 - the prudent operator stan-
dard.19
The obligation to drill an exploratory well is implied because
of the lessor's interest in prompt exploration of his land in order
15. MERRILL, at 472.
16. Meyers, The Effect on Implied Covenants of Conservation Laws and Prac-
tices, 4 RocKy MT. MINERAL L. INST. 463, 464 (1958).
17. This is the usual classification, and is that of Professor Merrill, set forth
in his treatise, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES 23 (2d ed. 1940).
The academic disputes which center about this classification are not sufficiently
important, for the purposes of this study, to be explored in great detail.
18. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801 (2d Cir. 1905).
19. See Malone, Sufficiency of Development of Leased Premises, PROCEEDINGS,
DEEP SOUTH REGIONAL MEETING, New Orleans, La., Nov. 29, 1955, A.B.A.
SECTION OF MINERAL LAW 3 (1955). Recent cases in which the prudent opera-
tor standard is discussed and applied include: Meeker v. Ambassador Oil Co., 308
F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1963) ; Sun Oil Co. v. Frantz, 291 F.2d 52 (10th Cir. 1961) ;
Olsen v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 212 F. Supp. 332 (1963) ; Simmons v. Pure
Oil Co., 124 So.2d 161 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960), aff'd, 241 La. 592, 129 So.2d
786 (1961); Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Sykes, 147 So. 2d 290 (Miss. 1963);
Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Andreae, 147 So. 2d 116 (Miss. 1963) ; Wells v. Con-
tinental Oil Co., 142 So. 2d 215 (Miss. 1962) ; Bales v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp.,
362 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. 1963).
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to secure revenue. The lease is said to have been given not "for
speculative purposes, but for present benefits or for benefits to
be obtained within a reasonable time. '
20
In the absence of known geological facts to the contrary
(and, it should be noted, in the absence of payment and accept-
ance of delay rentals), the remaining portions of the leased
premises should also be developed if the exploratory well is com-
pleted as a producer. 2 1 This covenant is for the protection of
the lessor against two kinds of harms which conceivably could
transpire: (a) failure to drill enough wells might result in the
permanent loss of oil, and (b) a slower rate of production might
result in a deprivation of the use of the capital represented by
the unproduced royalty oil. 22
The covenant to market the product is simply a furtner ex-
tension of the notion that the major consideration for the grant-
ing of the lease by the lessor is the receipt by him of royalty
payments for the use of his land.
Where it can be shown that the hypothetical "reasonably pru-
dent operator" would drill a well upon the leased premises in
order to protect the land from drainage of the underlying min-
eral deposit by a well on a neighboring tract, the lessee is held
to an obligation to drill such a well. It must be shown that the
adjacent well is a commercial producer and is actually draining
the deposit.23
The theory has been advanced by some writers that the
lessee should be under a duty, separate and apart from the
other implied covenants of the lease, to attempt to develop pro-
duction from lower strata where available data shows that
there is a likelihood of such production in profitable quanti-
ties.2 4 One eminent author in the field has suggested that the
usual standard of performance, the prudent-operator test,
should not limit this duty. This suggestion is illustrated by the
case of a rancher upon whose land there have been drilled three
producers, after which there is discovered a producing sand on
20. Mansfield Gas Co. v. Alexander, 97 Ark. 167, 133 S.W. 887 (1911).
21. Moses, The Effect of Louisiana's Conservation Statute on the Doctrine of
Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases, 27 TUL. L. REv. 313 (1953).
22. Meyers, The Effect on Implied Covenants of Conservation Laws and Prac-
tices, 4 ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INST. 463, 464 (1958).
23. Ibid.
24. Meyers, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration, 34 TEXAS L. REV.
553 (1956).
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premises two miles away from the lessor's land. In this situa-
tion, it is his contention that there is a duty upon the lessee to
explore the deeper formation without regard to the prudent-
operator rule, and without consideration of the expectation of
profit from the exploration of the deeper formation. Dissent
has been registered from this stand by several writers who con-
tend that the situation is properly governed by the implied cove-
nant to develop, measured by the prudent-operator standard, 25
and a recent case arising in Oklahoma has adopted this posi-
tion.2 6 It is also said that it is only fair to take into considera-
tion the usual requirement that the lessee be able to make some
reasonable profit out of the drilling operation. Some cases,
however, demonstrate a trend toward extension of the rule of
"reasonable diligence" to require further development, both
vertically and horizontally, than would have been required under
older statements of the "prudent-operator" standard.2 1
The author of the authoritative treatise in this field, 28 Pro-
fessor Maurice Merrill, has advocated the position that the ad-
vent of the conservation laws has brought about the birth of a
new implied duty, the duty to "take such steps as are necessary
to qualify him under the regulations, to secure the largest pos-
sible allowable, ' 29 and that the lessee who has stopped short of
the complete exhaustion of all remedies toward this end and
who has not performed all necessary administrative acts to se-
cure prudent development has not discharged his duties to the
25. Brown, The Implied Covenant for Additional Development, 13 Sw. L.J.
149, 168-69 (1.959) ; Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by
an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 11 TEXAS L. REv. 399 (1933). Accord, Clifton
v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959), discussed, 31 Miss, L.J. 34, 47 (1960).
26. In Chenoweth v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 314 F.2d 63, 66 (10th
Cir. 1963), the following discussion is found: "The prudent operator rule as ap-
plied in Oklahoma has been considered by this court in a number of cases ....
Under these authorities, the rule does not require an oil and gas lessee to further
develop the lease in a proven field unless there is a reasonable expectation that
there will be returned from production the cost of the development plus a reason-
able profit."
27. For instance, in Middleton v. California Co., 237 La. 1039, 112 So. 2d
704 (1959), the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that where exploratory tests
have proven parts of leased lands non-productive, "it is settled that the lessee
is bound to release all acreage which he does not intend to develop." And in
Romero v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 93 F. Supp. 117 (1950), modified and
aff'd, 194 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1952), it was said that "under decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States as well as the Louisiana Supreme Court a
mineral lessee must either develop his leasehold or give up his lease." See also
Coyle v. North American Oil Consolidated, 201 La. 99, 9 So. 2d 473 (1942)
Wier v. Grubb, 228 La. 254, 82 So. 2d 1 (1955).
28. MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES (2d ed. 1940).
29. Merrill, Fulfilling Implied Covenants Administratively, 9 OKLA. L. REV.
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lessor. Arguments supporting this fifth implied covenant are
that the exclusiveness of the lessee's operating rights, and its
access to most of the pertinent data relating to the leased min-
erals, render him the only person qualified to represent the
interests of the owner in matters pertaining to production of
minerals from the land.30 Although considerable controversy
surrounds this new obligation of the lessee,8 1 it has been judi-
cially accepted in a few states. One of the most direct state-
ments in support of the duty to perform all necessary adminis-
trative acts to secure prudent development is found in a recent
California decision :3
".. . it has become accepted law in this state that there is
an implied covenant of diligent exploration and diligent op-
eration of any producing wells. Imminent in this implied
obligation is that of doing such incidental or subsidiary acts
as may be reasonably necessary to accomplish the major
purpose - in this instance the procuring of the drilling per-
mit through an easily obtained zoning exception .... Appel-
lant (lessee) was subject to an implied obligation to obtain
the necessary drilling permit through a zone variance. 13 8
The idea adopted by the California court is beginning to
gather support, both from the authors and experts in the field,
and from some courts to date. Several considerations militate
in favor of its application where the interests of the lessor and
lessee are not directly opposed, including the lessee's superior
position to that of the lessor in dealing with regulatory bodies
due to its usually continuous contact with such agencies. How-
ever, in instances in which the interests of lessor and lessee are
in direct opposition, imposition of a duty upon the lessee to
press the lessor's case to the detriment of its own interests
would seem unreasonable, and application of a lesser obligation
125 (1956) ; Merrill, Current Problems in the Law of Implied Covenants'in Oil
and Gas Leases, 23 TEXAS L. REV. 137 (1944).
30. Moses, The Effect of Louisiana's Conservation Statute on the Doctrine of
Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases, 27 TuL. L. REV. 313 (1953).
31. Representative of the authors who have supported Professor Merrill's sug-
gestion are the following: Moses, The Effect of Louisiana's Conservation Statute
on the Doctrine of Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Law and Taxation, 27
TUL. L. REV. 313 (1953). Contra: Eberhardt, Effect of Conservation Laws,
Rules and Regulations on Rights of Lessors, Lessees and Owners of Unleased
Mineral Interests, 5 INSTITE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 125, 127
(1954) ; Conn, Trends in the Application of the Implied Covenant of Further
Development, MINERAL SECTION OF THE OKLA. BAR ASS'N, December 5, 1958.
32. Baldwin v. Kubetz, 148 Cal. App. 2d 937, 307 P.2d 1005 (1957).
33. Ibid.
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would appear warranted. Such a duty could be fitted into the
framework of the relatively new "duty of fair dealing."
A duty of "fair dealing" has recently been suggested, and
finds support in a few judicial statements, mostly in obiter dicta
as to the general standard of conduct which must be maintained
between lessor and lessee. As its primary advocate points out,
"the cases in which a breach of the duty of fair dealing has been
found are few in number and hence the character and extent of
the duty are difficult to discern. 13 4 One of the clearest discus-
sions of this new covenant is found in the recent Louisiana
court of appeal decision of McDonald v. Grande Corp.3 5 In that
case, the court said:
"Thus, in exercising the broad powers granted to a mineral
lessee by a lease, the mineral lessee is under the duty to exer-
cise them in accordance with the fundamental purpose for
which they were granted to him by the lessor-landowner,
which is to secure the greatest possible ultimate return to
the landowner from the mineral development of his land.
The mineral lessee must therefore act in connection with
the voluntary pooling power with the good faith intention of
serving the lessor-landowner's interest or, at the very least,
the mineral lessee must not act in connection with such pool-
ing power to the detriment of the lessor-landowner's inter-
est, since in pooling the lessor-landowner's land, the lessee
is acting virtually as the former's agent as well as for it-
self." 30
This obligation may be illustrated by an Oklahoma case, 37 in
which a community lease had been executed by the owners of
twenty-one lots. The lease authorized the inclusion of other
lots "at any time" and the lessee, after some producers had been
drilled on the land owned by the plaintiffs, sought to permit the
owners of other lots to join the unit and share in the royalties
from the producers. It was shown that the lessee owned the
royalty interests in these lots, and the court denied the lessee
the right to include them, observing, as did the court in the Mc-
34. Meyers, The Effect on Implied Covenants of Conservation Laws and Prac-
tices, 4 RocKy MT. MINERAL L. INST. 463, 513 (1958).
35. 148 So. 2d 441 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 150 So. 2d 588 (La.
1963).
36. Id. at 449. See also Butler v. Nepple, 6 Cal.2d 767, 354 P.2d 239 (1960)
Labbe v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 350 S.W. 2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
37. Imes v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 184 Okla. 79, 84 P.2d 1106 (1938).
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Donald case, that "the lessee was virtually the agent of the les-
sors, and for this reason he was bound to use good faith."' 8
It would appear that all of the obligations which have been
inferred from the lessor-lessee relationship are mere particu-
larizations of a much broader doctrine: the rule that the lessee
must conduct operations on the leased premises as would a rea-
sonably prudent operator under similar circumstances. The
foundation case in this area is Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co.,39
in which the court stated the "reasonably prudent operator test"
in the following terms:
"No obligation rests on [the lessee] to carry the operations
beyond the point where they will be profitable to him, even
if some benefit to the lessor will result from them. It is only
to the end that oil and gas shall be extracted with benefit
or profit to both that reasonable diligence is required. What-
ever, in the circumstances, would be reasonably expected of
operators of ordinary prudence, having regard to the inter-
ests of both lessor and lessee, is what is required. '40
This rule, enunciated in 1905, has also undergone many
changes under the conservation statutes. The notion of "dili-
gence" has taken on an entirely different meaning in some sit-
uations. However, this is not to say that there has been a com-
plete reversal in this idea. Speaking of the fictional "prudent
operator," and his present esteem in the law, a well-known prac-
titioner has said: "like another fictional character- 'the rea-
sonable and prudent man' of tort fame- the vacuum which
would result from his demise would be hard to fill."'41 The dis-
cussion to follow will point up the role which the "prudent op-
erator" theory plays under present law.
A review of the law of fourteen oil and gas-producing states,
reveals great variance in the modes of remedy available to the!
lessor upon proof of a breach of an implied covenant by the!
lessee.42 The two major remedies are damages and total or par-
38. Id. at 81, 84 P.2d at 1109.
39. 140 Fed. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
40. Id. at 814.
41. Malone, Sufficiency of Development of Leased Premises, PROCEEDINGS,.
DEEP SOUTH REGIONAL MEETING, New Orleans, La., Nov. 29, 1955, A.B.A.
SECTION ON MINERAL LAW 3, 10 (1955).
42. See generally Brown, The Implied Covenant for Additional Development,
13 Sw. L.J. 149, 171-75 (1959).
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tial cancellation of the lease. In three states, Kansas, 43 Texas, 4
and Nebraska, 45 damages is the preferred remedy, although the
courts of those states will order cancellation of a lease where
there could be no other adequate relief. The remedy of forfei-
ture has been recognized and applied in Arkansas,
46 Indiana,47
Kentucky,48 Louisiana,4 9 New Mexico, 50 and Oklahoma, 51 but not
in California, 52 Illinois, 5s Ohio, 54 and West Virginia, 55 which
limit the lessor to an action for damages. Forfeiture is allowed
in all these states, of course, for a breach of an express covenant
in the lease. The Pennsylvania5 6 rule is that the lessor may have
an action for forfeiture only where it is shown that the lessee
has abandoned the lease.
As previously indicated, the remedy in Louisiana is cancel-
lation of the lease. However, article 1933 of the Louisiana Civil
Code, which makes a putting in default prerequisite to recovery
of damages for passive breach of an obligation, has been inter-
preted to apply to cancellation of a mineral lease for breach of
an implied covenant.57 A lessee who is not placed in default
43. Stamper v. Jones, Shelburne & Farmer, Inc., 188 Kan. 626, 364 P.2d
972 (1961) ; Christiansen v. Virginia Drilling Co., 170 Kan. 355, 226 P.2d 263
(1951).
44. Christie, Mitchell & Mitchell Co. v. Howell, 359 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1962); Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27
(1929) ; Grubb v. McAfee, 109 Tex. 527, 212 S.W. 464 (1919).
45. William v. Farrar, 174 Neb. 827, 119 N.W.2d 686 (1963).
46. Nolan v. Thomas, 228 Ark. 572, 309 S.W.2d 727 (1958).
47. Mayhew v. Callard, 312 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1963); Lowdermilk v. Ohio
Oil Co., 203 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1953); cf. Carr v. Huntington Light & Fuel
Co., 33 Ind. App. 1, 70 N.E. 552 (1904).
48. Sapp v. Massey, 358 S.W.2d 490 (Ky. App. 1962).
49. See, e.g., McDonald v. Grande Corp., 148 So. 2d 441, 449 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, and cases cited therein.
50. Libby v. DeBaca, 51 N.M. 95, 179 P.2d 263 (1947).
51. Morrison v. Johnson, 199 Okla. 264, 185 P.2d 208 (1947).
52. El Rio Oils v. Chase, 95 Cal. App.2d 402, 212 P.2d 927 (1949).
53. Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., 263 Ill. 518, 105 N.E. 308 (1914).
54. Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 118, 48 N.E. 502 (1897).
55. Cotiga Development Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 128 S.E.2d 626 (W.
Va. App. 1963).
56. Girolami v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 365 Pa. 455, 76 A.2d 375 (1950).
57. Billeaud Planters, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., 144 F. Supp. 564, 573
(1956), af'd, Billeaud Planters, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., 245 F.2d 14
(2d Cir. 1957) (involving express requirement of notice, but discussing require-
ment of putting in default absent express lease provision) ; Iberian Oil Corp. v.
Texas Crude Oil Co., 212 F. Supp. 941 (W.D. La. 1963) ; Touchet v. Humble
Oil & Refining Co., 191 F. Supp. 291 (1960) ; McDonald v. Grande Corp., 148
So. 2d 441 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 244 La. 128, 150 So. 2d 588
(1963); Brown v. Sugar Creek Syndicate, 195 La. 865, 197 So. 583 (1940);
Hiller v. Humphreys Carbon Co., 165 La. 370, 115 So. 623 (1928); Pipes v.
Payne, 156 La. 791, 101 So. 144 (1924). See also Livingston v. Scully, 38 La.
Ann. 781, 784-87 (1886) (discussion of general rules of putting in default)
Comment, 27 TUL. L. REv. 353, 355 (1953).
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prior to the commencement of a suit for cancellation of the
lease can maintain an exception of no cause of action:
"... plaintiff, before suing to have the contract declared
forfeited, should have made demand on defendants to further
develop the property, and should have given them a reason-
able time within which to have done so. In other words,
plaintiff should have put defendants in default ....
"As plaintiff's petition does not allege that defendants were
put in default, we are of the opinion that it discloses no
cause of action."58
A SKETCH OF THE VARIous REGULATORY SCHEMES
Before focusing attention upon the impact of conservation
laws upon the mutual obligations of the lessor and the lessee, it
would be well to outline briefly the nature of the several legisla-
tive programs which are presently in force.
The three major species of regulations are: (a) well-location
regulation, (b) well-production regulation, and (c) unitization
or pooling.
A graphic illustration of the circumstances which gave rise
to the need for spacing regulations is found in the following
excerpt:
"Prior to the adoption of this rule many lease lines were
crowded so closely that the derrick legs actually rested on
the lease boundary line. The owners of the offset leases, to
comply with the implied and express covenants of their
leases then had to offset the lease line at a point equidistant.
In many places in Oklahoma one may still see these twin
derricks with their feet together."5 9
To prevent this kind of waste, well-location regulation was
evolved. This device is closely related to that of unitization and
pooling, as it is necessary for their effective functioning. When
a given area is unitized, the conservation order usually con-
tains a provision that there shall be but one well drilled on the
unitized area, at or near the center of the unit. Other wells in
58. Pipes v. Payne, 156 La. 791, 797, 101 So. 144, 146 (1924).
59. Robinson, Conservation in Oil and Gas, Oklahoma 1988-1948, CONSERVA-
TION OF OIL AND GAS 411 (Murphy ed. 1949).
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the area are prohibited by this order. One of the main purposes
of this regulation is prevention of the waste which would other-
wise result from strict adherence to the implied obligation that
the lessee protect the land against drainage from other wells.
The device of prorationing limits the amounts of minerals
which a given operator may produce from his well, with the
level of restricted production usually determined by either
actual market demand or the so-called "maximum efficient rate
of production." 60
As indicated above, the conservation devices of well-location
regulation and well-production regulation are usually necessary
concomitants to the broader device of unitization, which is the
most complete form of regulation of the production of oil and
gas. This system attempts, through application of good en-
gineering methods, to accomplish in a scientific manner for the
entire reservoir what the other two types of regulation attempt
to accomplish within the limits of the lease boundary.6 1 It may
either be compulsory, under the conservation statute, or volun-
tary, effected by the agreement of the parties, sometimes with
express authorization of the state's regulatory body.
THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATION LEGISLATION AND INTERPRETIVE
JUDICIAL DECISIONS UPON IMPLIED COVENANTS
The foregoing discussion has outlined the traditional classi-
fication of the implied covenants, along with some new ones now
being proposed, and has also shown the nature of the several
kinds of regulatory regimes in use throughout the petroleum-
producing states. There can be no doubt that these legislative
regulations of the oil and gas industry have greatly altered the
implied covenants in oil and gas leases, and have actually super-
seded them in some instances.6 2 There are several shadings in
60. The maximum efficient rate of production is defined as that rate at which
production may be effected without causing undue dissipation of reservoir energy
or ultimate recoverable hydrocarbons from the deposit.
61. Gibbens, The Effect of Conservation Legislation on Implied Covenants in
Oil and Gas Leases, 4 OKLA. L. Rzv. 337, 362 (1951).
62. See Alston v. Southern Prod. Co., 207 La. 370, 21 So. 2d 383 (1945), in
which the Louisiana Supreme Court said "an order of the Conservation Depart-
ment . . . can have the effect of superseding pooling agreements made between
owners of adjacent lands." In the recently decided case of Kimbrough v. Atlantic
Refining Co., 152 So. 2d 412 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963), the court stated: "[T]he
orders of the Commissioner of Conservation relating to drilling and production of
oil are paramount, become the law of the case, and govern, despite conventional
contractual obligations between landowners and lessees. Delatte v. Woods, 232
La. 341, 94 So. 2d 281; Hunter Company v. Shell Oil Company, 211 La. 893,
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the controversy as to the extent to which the conservation acts
have altered, or done away with, the implied covenants. One ex-
treme is represented by this statement:
"It would seem, when all the factors are considered together,
that implied covenants no longer embody a correct approach
to the problem of oil and gas leases. It is illogical and un-
reasonable to believe that oil and gas leases must be so con-
strued as to prevent delay and promote development, regard-
less of the resultant injury. The courts surely realize that
the policy of development has been superseded by a program
of conservation to prevent economic and physical waste." 63
Another writer has stated that "even if these implied cove-
nants have not been abolished, the heart has been cut out of
them as we know them."
64
A more conservative and qualified stand is taken by another
writer:
"It does not follow, however, that a lessee, confronted with
the assertion that he has failed to perform duties imposed
upon him by the law of implied covenants, may set up an
impregnable defense merely by pointing to an administra-
tive regulation which, on its face forbids compliance with
the obligation put forward. The legal problems involved are
far too complex to be resolved so easily.''65
The impact of the conservation laws upon the mutual obliga-
tions of the lessee and lessor has raised major questions, some
of which are: What duties are affected by the conservation
statutes? How extensive have these changes been? What effi-
cacy, if any, are the covenants allowed to have within the frame-
work of conservation legislation? Have the factual suppositions
undergone such change as to leave the covenants without a foun-
dation in fact, or a reason for existence?
31 So. 2d 10; Landry v. Flaitz, La.App., 148 So. 2d 360." See also Simmons v.
Pure Oil Co., 241 La. 592, 129 So. 2d 786 (1961).
63. Kyle, Conservation of Oil and Gas: Kansas 1938-1948, CONSERVATION OF
OIL AND GAS 149 (Murphy ed. 1949).
64. Gibbens, The Effect of Conservation Legislation on Implied Covenants in
Oil and Gas Leases, 4 OKLA. L. REV. 337, 361 (1951).
65. Merrill, Current Problems in the Law of Implied Covenants in Oil and
Gas Leases, 23 TEXAS L. REV. 137, 141 (1945).
19641
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
EFFECT OF PRORATION UPON THE MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS OF
THE LEASE
This mode of regulation was the first major type to be
enacted,6 6 and is still with us; its principle is an integral part
of many of the more modern conservation statutes. Since this
kind of scheme means greatly restricted production, whereas
the doctrine of implied covenants was originally dedicated to
obtaining the maximum minerals out of the lease in the shortest
possible time, it is obvious that proration must have changed
some of these implied covenants.
The treatment of this regulation, as well as that of the well-
location regulation, will be relatively brief, since these earlier
types of regulation have given way, in many producing states,
to the more extensive regulation of the unitization regime.
It will be recalled that the general test for determining
whether or not there has been a compliance with the implied
covenants in the lease is that of the reasonably prudent oper-
ator: whatever in the circumstances would be expected of oper-
ators of ordinary prudence, having regard to the interests of
both the lessor and the lessee, is what is required. A part of
this test for compliance is that no obligation rests upon the
lessee to carry the operations beyond the point where they will
be profitable to him, even if some benefit to the lessor would
result from these operations.57 This rule has played a key role
in the limiting of the original implied covenants of the lease
under the proration statutes.
For instance, in State v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,"" the lessor
of gas-producing lands sued for breach of the offset covenant
of the lease, at a time when the demand for gas was very slight.
Because of this low demand, the allowable from this field was
also very low, and the court denied relief to the lessor on the
basis that the offset well was not likely to be profitable to the
lessee under existing market conditions. A similar result was
reached by the Kansas court, 9 in a situation in which the allow-
able had been set at only 1.45% of the potential daily produc-
tion.
66. Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 25 (1915).
67. Brown, The Implied Covenant for Additional Development, 13 Sw. L.J.
149, 156 (1959).
68. 161 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
69. Fischer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 156 Kan. 367, 133 P.2d 95 (1943).
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An interesting situation is posed by a 1941 Louisiana case,
Louisiana Gas Lands, Inc. v. Burrow,70 in which the lessee had
produced an amount of gas smaller than the allowable set by
the regulatory agency. In passing on the sufficiency of the peti-
tion, the Supreme Court said that the petition did not state a
cause of action, since it is not enough for the petition to state
that the lessee did not produce all that was allowed. However,
the court emphasized that it was not dealing with a "true pro-
ration order" but merely a general, permissive conservation law
which restricted production of gas wells to a certain percent-
age of their free flow. It has been suggested that the implica-
tion of this careful statement was that a proration order could
have the effect of setting a standard of conduct for measuring
the lessee's duty to produce.7 1
Proration statutes have not killed the implied covenants of
oil and gas leases, but have severely limited their operation. The
duty of the lessee is no longer the duty to produce as much as
possible and as quickly as possible, but has been translated into
the duty to produce the maximum amount possible within the
restrictions on production set by proration. This change has
taken place largely within the boundaries of the prudent-oper-
ator standard of conduct imposed on the lessee. The operator is,
of course, under no duty to produce over the allowable under
the statute, or order. But he is usually under a duty to produce
the amount set by the allowable unless he is able to show con-
vincing reasons why a reasonably prudent operator would not.
It is submitted that, in view of the fact that many economic and
physical facts relating to the reservoir in question are consid-
ered in setting field allowables, a reasonably prudent operator
would normally produce the amount which is set by the allow-
able, and that variations from this allowable should be the ex-
ception to the rule.
The covenant of diligent development of the premises under
lease has also been greatly modified by this regulation. If the
lessee can show that the drilling of additional wells, pursuant
to this covenant, will be unprofitable to him because of the low
allowable set for the leased land, the courts will not force him
70. 197 La. 275, 1 So. 2d 518 (1941).
71. Gibbens, The Effect of Conservation Legislation on Implied Covenants in
Oil and Gas Leases, 4 OKLA. L. REv. 337, 363 (1951). Other cases involving eco-
nomic considerations influencing the lessee's duty include Risinger v. Arkansas-
Louisiana Gas Co., 198 La. 101, 3 So. 2d 289 (1941) ; LeLong v. Richardson,
126 So. 2d 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
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to conduct drilling operations on this land at the suit of the
lessor for the breach of the development covenant.
EFFECT OF SPACING REGULATION UPON MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS OF
THE LEASE
Over-concentration of wells caused much waste and forced
the states to adopt well-spacing regulations in order to prevent
this kind of activity. It is at once obvious that there is a direct
conflict between this sort of regulation and the implied cove-
nant to diligently develop since the amount of production is
necessarily curtailed by an order of a state regulatory body
that there shall only be, for instance, one well per forty acres
of land within a given area. Insofar as spacing regulation of
particular reservoirs is concerned, such regulations are usually
set only after consideration of many economic and physical fac-
tors associated with production from the area, and raise several
questions as to the impact upon the mutual obligations of the
oil and gas lessee and lessor. What is the extent of the duty
owed the lessor by the lessee under this kind of regulation?
Since there is a careful study made of the production from the
field in which the lease lies before a determination of the well
spacing, does the spacing order set an inflexible standard of
conduct for the lessee, or may he, within the limitations of the
prudent operator test, drill a lesser number of wells on the
leased land? And, does this regulation set up any new duties
for the lessee? It must be said at the outset of this discussion
that the cases do not offer any definitive answer to these ques-
tions, but some of the more important cases will be analyzed in
an attempt to discern an indication of the direction in which
the law might be formulated in the future.
The typical spacing regulation applies only to a specific pro-
ducing stratum.7 2 Therefore, this type of regulation does not
seem to affect the implied covenant of further exploration as to
sands not affected by the spacing order. If a given area has
two or more producing sands, the well density at the surface
may be much greater than that ordered for the wells going to
only one particular stratum. Accordingly, it would appear that
the lessor could prevail in a case in which he contended that
the lessee had breached his covenant of further exploration,
72. Meyers, The Effect on Implied Covenants of Conservation Laws and Prac-
tices, 4 ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INST. 463, 472 (1958).
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and that the lessee would have no defense in the spacing order
where his failure was to explore sands not affected by the order.
Clearly, well spacing affects and limits the covenant for rea-
sonable development of the premises. There is some question,
not answered directly in the cases, as to the extent to which the
spacing order establishes a standard of conduct for the lessee to
follow. The following factual situation will illustrate the prob-
lem. The state regulatory body, after hearing all pertinent data
relating to the production from the land, decrees a well spacing
of one well per forty acres. The lease encompasses 160 acres,
and the lessee has drilled two producers from the north half of
the land. Does the spacing order set a minimum for drilling
operations, as well as a maximum? Is the lessee free to drill
less than the amount of wells set by the regulatory body after
due hearing, or must he drill one well per forty acres to qualify
as the mythical prudent operator? The more reasonable view
holds that the spacing order is merely another matter of proof
in the inquiry of whether or not the operator is a reasonably
prudent operator.7 3 If the lessor is able to show that commer-
cial quantities could be produced from the south half, he will
have proved a substantial part of his case.
Another matter of importance is the burden-of-proof ques-
tion. Is the lessor bound to show that an exception to the spac-
ing order could have been obtained by the lessee in order to
show that he did not diligently develop the premises? Or, may
the lessee merely point to the conservation regulation as an
absolute defense? Under the theory of the proponents of the
proposed new implied covenant of the lessee to exhaust admin-
istrative remedies in the interest of the lessor, it would seem
that the lessee could not point to the conservation order as an
absolute defense. This view has been taken by a Texas court,74
which took judicial notice that under the Texas statute there
were provisions for the procurement of an exception to the spac-
ing order. The court said that, in the absence of proof by the
lessee that he had attempted to obtain such an exception, the
73. Id. at 477. An interesting view on this problem is found in a note to a
case in 7 OIL & GAS REP. 1472 (1958) by Professor Kuntz: "In practice, the
drilling unit set by the Commission sets the pattern [for] minimum as well as
maximum drilling operations because of demands by lessors upon lessees to de-
velop all authorized drilling sites. The Commission is not designed to be a forum
to determine the respective rights of lessors and lessees under implied covenants.
Yet, if it gives weight to the economics of drilling operations, it is being used
indirectly to adjudicate rights."
74. Willingham v. Bryson, 294 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
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lessor would prevail in a suit for cancellation of the lease for
the breach of the exploration covenant.
Since the spacing regulation allows only one well within the
specified acreage limitation, it clearly renders almost ineffec-
tive the obligation of the lessee to prevent drainage from the
leased land, leaving this duty intact only where the offset well
may be drilled within the limitations of the spacing order.
THE EFFECT OF UNITIZATION AND POOLING UPON MUTUAL
OBLIGATIONS OF THE LEASE
When proration statutes proved somewhat ineffective
against wasteful practices in the oil and gas industry, the next
plateau in the advance of regulatory schemes was that of spac-
ing orders, or well-location regulation. As the shortcomings of
both of these became apparent, some states turned to a much
more comprehensive form of regulation- unitization. This
program usually integrates both proration and spacing restric-
tions, so the above discussion of these two points will have some
application to this section.
The statement of a well-known practitioner in the field of
oil and gas law shows the extent of the impact which some be-
lieve the compulsory unitization statutes have had upon the im-
plied covenants :7.
"The law of capture is effectively repealed in a field where
compulsory unitization has been put into effect, and the doc-
trine of implied covenants, which is based on the law of cap-
ture, must go with it. It remains to be seen whether a
changed doctrine of implied covenants will be retained by
the courts to protect the lessor's interest under unitization."
Other commentators have said that this view is too extreme,
and subscribe to the conclusion that there is some place for the
implied covenants to operate in the pooled-unitized field - "the
theater for their performance will be the unitized area instead
of the individual lease. ' 76 To buttress this position, the following
points are made. There is no impairment of the original obliga-
tion to operate the producing wells in a prudent manner, even
though the field is pooled or unitized. Similarly, there is no
75. Gibbens, The Effect of Conservation Legislation on Implied Covenants in
Oil and Gas Leases, 4 OIUA. L. REv. 337, 363 (1951).
76. Merrill, Implied Covenants, Conservation and Unitization, 2 OKLA. L.
REv. 469, 477 (1949).
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alteration in the duty to market the product once production is
achieved. And, the unit operator is under an obligation to drill
a test well as he would be if there were no unitization or pool-
ing.77
Because of the variation in the ways in which the questions
have arisen with regard to this kind of conservation regulation,
and to facilitate discussion, each covenant will be discussed sep-
arately.7 8 As the cases which raise questions of validity of the
lease under conservation statutory unitization or pooling ar-
rangements involve four factual situations, these cases will be
classified as follows :79
Case 1. All of leased land is included within the unit.
Production is obtained from, or drilling commenced upon,
leased land.
Case 2. All of the leased land is included within the unit.
Production is obtained from, or drilling commenced upon,
land other than leased land, but within the unit.
Case 3. Part of the leased land is within the unit. Pro-
duction is obtained from, or drilling commenced upon, that
part of the lease within the unit.
Case 4. Part of the leased land is within the unit. Pro-
duction is obtained from, or drilling commenced upon, land
within the unit, but not on the leased land within the unit.
(1) The Initial Test Well, or Exploratory, Covenant
As above indicated, this duty is not affected in any way
when the lessee is designated the unit operator. However, where
this is not the case, the obligation to drill an initial exploratory
well is abrogated. In the Louisiana case of Crichton v. Lee, s8 a
Case 1 situation, the court held that the effect of the order of
the regulatory agency's pooling all the leases in a field for
77. Eberhardt, Effect of Conservation Laws, Rules and Regulations on Rights
of Lessors, Lessees and Owners of Unleased Mineral Interests, 5 INSTITUTE ON
OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 125, 144-45 (1954).
78. The covenant to market the product, a duty not directly affected by con-
servation schemes, is not important for the purposes of this study and will not
be discussed. Recent decisions involving this obligation include Gazin v. Pan
American Petroleum Corp., 367 P.2d 1010 (Okla. 1962); Cotiga Development
Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 128 S.E.2d 626 (W. Va. App. 1962).
79. This classification is that used by Professor Meyers, The Effect on Implied
Covenants of Conservation Laws and Practices, 4 ROCKy MT. MINERAL L. INST.
463, 496 (1958).
80. 209 La. 561, 25 So. 2d 229 (1946).
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unitized operation superseded the lessee's obligation to the
lessor to drill a test well, where the lessee, as unit operator, had
drilled elsewhere in the unitized field. It may be noted that the
court in Crichton was dealing with an express duty in the lease,
but that it used language in the opinion which is broad enough
to cover a case in which the covenant would have been implied.
Other Louisiana cases have followed this ruling in similar situa-
tions, and in Hunter v. Vaughn,81 the court stated that the in-
ability of the lessee to drill because the leased premises had
been placed within a unit might be viewed as due to a force ma-
jeure, and thus excused. This view effectively evaded discus-
sion of the issue whether or not the order of the conservation
department abrogated private contracts between parties. Be-
cause the rule has become so well settled that drilling anywhere
on the unitized land is drilling for the entire unit in Case 1 and
Case 2 situations, there is very little jurisprudence disputing
this point.
More controversy centers around the situations presented in
Case 3 and Case 4, in which part of the leased land is not within
the unit. In this circumstance, does the drilling of an initial test
well upon the unit, either on or off the leased premises, amount
to drilling of a well on the leased premises in order to extend
the lease beyond its primary term? The question has been an-
swered in the affirmative, by such cases as the Louisiana de-
cision in the Hardy case,8 2 a Case 2 situation, in which the lessor
claimed that the lessee had not drilled on the lease within the
primary term, thereby losing the lease, although there had been
production from the unit into which the lessor's land had been
placed. The court dismissed the lessor's suit, using the follow-
ing language:
"... the clause in the lease requiring defendants to drill a
well on the leased premises within the primary term of five
years is not applicable where a well producing gas in pay-
ing quantities has been drilled on land within the drilling
unit of which the leased land forms a part and where the
lessee is prohibited by orders of the Department of Conser-
vation from drilling a well on the leased premises.
81. 217 La. 459, 46 So. 2d 735 (1950).
82. Hardy v. Union Producing Co., 207 La. 137, 20 So. 2d 734 (1944).
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".. . the right of defendants to drill a well on the 47 acre
tract covered by the lease was in effect taken away from
them by the orders of the Commissioner of Conservation
"83
Thus, by compelling analogy, the obligation of the lessee to
drill an initial test well is abrogated where the lessee is not
designated the unit operator. Where the lessee is the unit oper-
ator, his duty remains unchanged by the unitization order.
(2) The Diligent Development Obligation
In Case 1 and Case 2, it is settled that development of the
unitized land is tantamount to development of the leased prem-
ises, and the lessor has no cause of action against the lessee who
is not producing from his own leased land within the unit as
long as production is being achieved from the unit. Several
Louisiana decisions may be considered in connection with this
point. In Hardy, dealing primarily with the obligation to drill
the first well, the court made it clear that their holding in rela-
tion to that point applied equally to the duty to develop the
premises through the drilling of additional wells. The court
said:
"Defendants' hands were literally tied as the result of the
orders issued by the Commissioner of Conservation and they
could do nothing whatsoever to prevent the primary term
of the lease from expiring without drilling a well thereon.
' '8 4
Thus, the original covenant for adequate development of the
leased premises has undergone revision where Cases 1 and 2 are
involved, since the present rule is that production from the unit
is production for all of the leased premises lying therein. The
requirement that each and every lease be fully developed which
existed prior to the advent of the unitization scheme is no long-
er extant8 5
The law is not so well settled as to the impact of the unitiza-
tion order upon the covenants under Cases 3 and 4.
One of the major areas of dispute in this area is contained
in the following query: Is there a greater development obliga-
83. Id. at 141, 20 So. 2d at 737.
84. Ibid.
85. A caveat must ,be added here to the effect that this statement applies only
to the sand or sands unitized.
1964]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
tion owed to excluded acreage in Cases 3 and 4 under unitiza-
tion than there is owed to a lease unaffected by pooling or uni-
tization? Such a greater duty has been suggested in the Tenth
Circuit case of Gregg v. Harper-Turner Oil Co., 6 an Oklahoma
decision in which the lease covered 160 acres. Two wells had
been drilled thereon, a producer in 1943 and a dry hole in 1947:
In 1948, forty acres around the producer were included in a
unit, excluding the other 120 acres. The lessor made several de-
mands upon the lessee for further development of the lease out-
side the unit in 1948 and 1949, all to no avail. He then sued for
partial cancellation of the lease as to the 120 acres outside the
unit, which the court ordered. The court said :87
"[Lessees] caused the unitization agreement excluding this
120 acre tract therefrom to be effected. This resulted in a
division of the acreage of the [leased] tract. . . . As the
owner of the lease, [lessees] now stand in a different rela-
tionship to the excluded acreage than they do to the 40 acres
included in the producing unit. Equity will consider the
rights of both the lessor and the lessee under these circum-
stances. Their responsibilities as lessees became correspond-
ingly greater toward the excluded acreage than it was be-
fore severing by unitization." (Emphasis added.)
It may be noted that only two years had elapsed between the
completion of the last well on the leased premises and the de-
mand for further development thereon. Considering the fact
that most Oklahoma cases refuse cancellation where only a short
time has elapsed between the completion of the last well and the
demand for further development, this case may be viewed as in-
creasing the duty which the lessee owes the lessor as to the land
which lies outside the unitized area, by considerably shortening
this time.
On the other hand, in a Louisiana decision in which partial
cancellation was ordered in a case similar to that of the Gregg
litigation, the court used no language indicating a special duty
on the lessee as regards the land lying outside the unit.""
The two important Louisiana decisions of Hunter Co. v. Shell
86. 199 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1952), discussed in Meyers, The Effect on Implied
Covenants of Conservation Laws and Practices, 4 ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INST.
463, 505-06 (1958).
87. Id. at 5.
88. Nunley v. Shell Oil Co., 76 So. 2d 111 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954).
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Oil Co.8 9 and LeBlanc v. Danciger Oil & Ref. Co.,90 involving
Case 4 problems, should be discussed in this context. In the
Hunter Co. case, the issue was whether or not the land subject
to the lease lying outside the unit was extended beyond the pri-
mary term by production within the unit but not on the leased
premises. 91 The Supreme Court held that such production did
hold the leased land outside the unit, but noted that the lessor
had a remedy, if it was found that "the producing well in the
unit is not sufficient to meet the obligation of adequate develop-
ment of property covered by the lease. ' 92 This dictum has been
puzzled over by several writers, with contradictory conclusions.
It seems that the court meant that the lessor had a right to have
the lease cancelled partially, only as to that part of the lease
which was excluded from the unit, although this result has been
termed "undesirable and unworkable. ' 93 One writer interprets
the passage to mean that each lessor whose land is within the
unit has a right of action to cancel the lease for failure to ade-
quately develop the unit itself, and not the leased land lying
outside the unit.9 4 This writer is unable to subscribe to that
view, and believes that the court merely was striving to miti-
gate the stringency of holding the leased land outside the unit
by production within the unit, regardless of how small might be
the area within the unit. The LeBlanc case involved a factual
situation closely similar to that presented in the Hunter Co.
case, and the court followed the rules announced in the latter.
A point raised by the Hunter Co. and LeBlanc cases, which
89. 211 La. 893, 31 So. 2d 10 (1947).
90. 218 La. 463, 49 So. 2d 855 (1950).
91. This is the general rule, as stated in 2 Su MIURS, OIL AND GAS § 302.1,
at 293 (perm. ed. 1945) : "Where only a part of a leased tract is included within
a pooled or unitized area, a majority of the courts hold that drilling or produc-
tion within the unitized area during the primary term of the lease, which pre-
vents the termination of the lease at the end of the primary term, prevents its
termination as to the portion of the lease excluded from the unitized area as well
as to that portion included." This rule was reaffirmed in Delatte v. Woods, 232
La. 341, 94 So. 2d 281 (1957).
92. 211 La. 893, 31 So. 2d 10 (1947). A recent decision of the Mississippi
Supreme Court includes a statement very similar to the one quoted. In Wells
v. Continental Oil Co., 142 So. 2d 215, 221 (Miss. 1962), the court said: "The
covenant to develop requires the lessee to develop all of the lease as would any
ordinary prudent operator. These plaintiffs have a remedy for a breach of this
covenant if it occurs, which remedy could consist of either a cancellation of that
part of the lease, for damages, or for both. See 35 Texas Law Review, 839, June
1957; Nunley v. Shell Oil Co., La. App. 1954, 76 So. 2d 111."
93. Eberhardt, Effect of Conservation Laws, Rules and Regulations on Rights
of Lessors, Lessees and Owners of Unleased Mineral Interests, 5 INSTITUTE ON
OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 125, 147 (1954).
94. Ibid.
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was also raised by the Gregg case, is the question whether there
may be effected a "division" of the lease, if the court is to de-
cree a partial cancellation of the lease for noncompliance with
the development covenant as to the land outside the unit. The
Louisiana court has steadfastly maintained that the obligation
of the lease is indivisible, a position illustrated by this passage
from the Hunter Co. case:
"It is true that the orders of the Commissioner divided the
lease in the sense that a part of the property described in
the lease was placed within the unit (Section 5) and the re-
mainder of the property formed no part of this unit. But
the question here presented is whether under the orders the
Commissioner divided the obligation of the lease. In our
opinion these orders by their provisions clearly did not di-
vide the obligation of the lease.
"The law is well settled that the lessee's obligation to
drill a well is indivisible in its nature, and that the grantor's
corresponding obligation to deliver the land is likewise in-
divisible, and that, if the obligation of one of the parties is
to be fulfilled entirely, the obligation of the other . . . must
likewise be fulfilled in whole." 95
However, the court in Gregg took what may be the more
realistic position, when it decreed cancellation as to the land
outside the unit, stating that a "division of the acreage" of the
lease had resulted in the subsequent formation of the unitized
area. The dissenting Justice in the Hunter Co. case stated that
the order of the conservation commissioner could indeed "legal-
ly cause to be excluded from a lease a portion of the acreage
provided for therein," in the valid exercise of his police pow-
ers. 96
A contrary line of reasoning to that employed in Hunter Co.
and LeBlanc was once adhered to. by the Mississippi Supreme
Court. In Gulf Prod. Co. v. Griffith,97 that court held that to
decree that the leased land outside the unit was held by pro-
duction from within the unit, but not on the lease itself, would
95. 211 La. 893, 901-02, 31 So. 2d 10, 13 (La. 1947).
96. Id. at 911, 31 So. 2d at 16 (lamiter, J., dissenting).
97. 218 Miss. 109, 65 So. 2d 447 (1953), discussed in Horton, Effect of Con-
servation Laws and Regulations on Contracts and Mineral Leases, 34 TUL. L.
REv. 439, 445 (1960).
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be tantamount to depriving landowners of property without due
process of law, since the landowner would not be paid for the
land outside the unit. However, Mississippi has now adopted
the majority rule in the recent case of Wells v. Continental Oil
Co.,98 in which the court distinguished the Griffith decision both
on the facts and on the ground that it was decided under a dif-
ferent conservation statute.
The Louisiana decision of Wilcox v. Shell Oil Co.99 is impor-
tant in this area, not so much for its actual holding, which only
dealt with an interpretation of the lease there in question, but
for the possible implications for the future which the language
of the opinion might carry, and problems presented by the facts
of the case in the field of implied covenants. An abstract of the
factual situation there will assist understanding of the case.
This was a Case 4 instance, in which the unitized area contained
160 acres. Eighty acres of this land was subject to the lease of
the plaintiff. The unitization order only covered the "FX" and
the "FY" sands. The lease provided that commencement of a
well, or production from a completed well, on any portion of a
unit in which all or part of the lease had been placed would have
the same effect, for the purpose of extending the lease beyond
the primary term, as would commencement of a well on, or pro-
duction from, the leased land itself. Pursuant to the establish-
ment of the unit, operations were begun, within the unit, but
not on the lessor's lease, and the well was drilled to both of the
sands specified in the unitization order, but without success.
The lessee then encountered another sand, the "FT" sand, which
showed some prospect of being productive. Then, only one day
before the delay rental was due the lessor, the lessee filed a dec-
laration of unit, and claimed that he was not bound to pay the
delay rental because the production which had been obtained
from the "FT" sand was production from the leased land, under
the terms of the lease agreement. The court, observing that
only the first two sands were included within the terms of the
original unitization order, held that the lessee did not achieve
production from the "FT" sand when it was part of the unit,
98. 142 So. 2d 215 (Miss. 1962).
99. Wilcox v. Shell Oil Co., 226 La. 417, 76 So. 2d 416 (1954). Commentary
includes: Davidson, Mineral Law Decisions of Louisiana Supreme Court of 1954,
3 LoUisiANA INST. MiN. L. 158, 164 (1954); Meyers, The Effect of Implied
Covenants of Conservation Laws and Practices, 4 ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INST.
463, 515 (1958) ; Comment, 36 TUL. L. REv. 769, 786 (1962). The rule an-
nounced in the Wilcox decision was reaffirmed in Mallett v. Union Oil & Gas
Corp., 232 La. 157, 94 So. 2d 16 (1957).
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and thus granted the cancellation which the lessor sought. If
this is viewed as only a case which puts a very restrictive inter-
pretation on the subject lease provisions, it is important only
in the drafting of pooling clauses. But a question arises as to
what the result would have been had there been production only
from one of the two sands which were specified in the original
unitization order - the "FX" or the "FV" sands. If production
were achieved from only one of these, would that production
maintain the lease as to that sand only, or would this have been
reasonable diligence in developing the entire lease, i.e. (under
the unitization order), the two sands? It could be argued that
the lessor in such a case would have a right to have the lease
cancelled as to the sand which was not developed, if he could
prove that a prudent operator would have effected such develop-
ment. 0
In Rogers v. Westhoma Oil Co.,' a case arising in Kansas,
the court had before it the question whether the "Pugh Clause"
allowed a horizontal division of the leased premises. The lease
provided for extension of the lease term as to "the premises"
covered and included by any consolidation of estates, but not
as to nonproducing areas not included within a production unit.
Consolidation was effected as to eleven producing horizons
above sea level, and the court decided that the Pugh Clause op-
erated to allow a horizontal severance of the leasehold estate.
In a supplemental opinion, the court denied that its decision was
a departure from the prudent operator standard, and empha-
sized that it involved merely a "question of lease termination at
the expiration of the primary term.' 11 2 In a dissenting opinion,
one judge agreed with the trial court's conclusion that the Pugh
Clause did not "specifically or clearly designate underground
horizons." The result reached by the court has been termed
"startling' 1 °3 and in direct contravention of the rule of indi-
visibility announced in the Hunter Co. case. 10 4
100. See Brown, The Implied Covenant for Additional Development, 13 Sw.
L.J. 149, 167 (1959) ; Eberhardt, Effect of Conservation Laws, Rules and Regu-
lations on Rights of Lessors, Lessees and Owners of Unleased Mineral Interests,
5 INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 125, 148 (1954) ; Gibbens,
The Effect of Conservation Legislation on Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas
Leases, 4 OKLA. L. REV. 337, 167 (1959).
101. 291 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1961).
102. Id. at 733.
103. Moses, Some Comments on the "Pugh" Clause in Louisiana Oil and Gas
Leases, 37 TuL. L. REV. 269, 278 (1963).
104. Hunter Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 893, 31 So. 2d 10 (1947).
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As a result of the Wilcox decision, a new lease form was
published which is aimed at an amelioration of the effect of that
decision. This form provides, in pertinent part:
"Any unit formed by Lessee hereunder may be created either
prior to or during or after the drilling of the well which is
then or thereafter becomes the unit well."'" 5
In Odom v. Union Producing Co.,106 the Louisiana Supreme
Court, construing a lease provision very similar to that set out
above, held that this pooling provision allowed lessee to extend
the lease by pooling part of the leased land with land on which
production had been effected. Answering the contention that
the Wilcox decision required cancellation of the lease because
production had not been obtained before the pooling had taken
place, the court said:07
"Unlike the lease in that case, the present lease authorizes
pooling after production and does not require the produc-
tion to be from a well completed to production on the unit.
Because of the variant lease provisions, we find the case in-
applicable."
In conclusion, it seems that future decisions might hold the
lessee to a greater duty of development as to the land lying
outside the unit than would exist without unitization. Further-
more, recent Louisiana decisions show that future developments
in this field will depend greatly, if not wholly, upon particular
lease provisions governing the effect of pooling and unitiza-
tion, with ambiguities in construction being resolved against
the lessee who prepares the lease contract 0 8
(3) The Offset, or Protection, Covenant
Under Cases 1 and 2, it would appear that the protection
obligation of the lessee is not present, where drainage is from
one part of the unit to another, since he is receiving revenue
from the minerals within the unit anyway. But if it can be
shown that there is drainage from the leased premises to non-
unit premises, or from unit to non-unit premises, the offset
105. Bath Form 42 CPM - New South Louisiana Revised Six (6) -Pooling,
Paragraph 2.
106. Odom v. Union Producing Co., 243 La. 48, 141 So. 2d 649 (1962).
107. 243 La. 48, 92, 141 So. 2d 649, 664 (1962).
108. 243 La. 48, 85, 141 So. 2d 649, 662 (1962).
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obligation is effective as to the unit operator.109 A more trouble-
some situation is the one posed where in Cases 3 or 4, there is
proven drainage from the portion of the leased land outside of
the unit to that portion of the leased premises within the unit.
While it is true that the owner of the leased land will continue
to receive some royalties on his oil, it will only be a royalty on
the proportionate part of the production from the whole unit.
Had he achieved production from the leased land outside the
unit, he would have been entitled to the entire royalty. No con-
vincing support for the lessor's right to damages in these cases
was found.
Therefore, it may be said that the offset, or protection,
covenant retains some life, but that it also has been greatly
modified by the unitization programs.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion has shown that the original im-
plied covenants have undergone great modification with the
advent of modern conservation statutes now in force in the
oil and gas producing states. As a result of the various hold-
ings interpreting the conservation statutes and their effect upon
the mutual obligations of the lessor and the lessee, the industry
has been constantly responding with changes in lease forms,
changes in leasing practices, etc. It has been indicated that
some writers are of the conviction that the implied covenants
have been rendered wholly obsolete by the philosophy and prac-
tices of conservation which now express the public interest in
the preservation of these irreplaceable minerals. The sounder
view is that the covenants have lost their vitality in many
areas, but are still very much alive, and very useful, in others.
Despite the great restrictions which have been judicially placed
upon the traditional covenants pursuant to conservation
schemes, some of the implied obligations will remain, although
in new configurations, as long as the lessee is held not to have
the basic right to use the leased property solely for his own
interests.
109. Where such a situation as that suggested in this section exists, i.e.,
drainage from unit to non-unit premises, an obligation may be imposed upon the
lessee to represent the lessor's interest before a regulatory agency in order to
secure appropriate orders. See generally Renner v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 187
Kan. 158, 354 P.2d 326 (1960), containing a good discussion of the duty of the
lessee to protect the leased premises against drainage from another tract.
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